Showing posts with label Bad Ideas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bad Ideas. Show all posts
"Women Don't Care About Contraception"
The Republican governor of South Carolina, Nikki Haley, does not seem to think that women care about contraception. If that is a mainstream view among Republican leaders, I am willing to bet they are a bit out of touch with the concerns of American women.
Do Freedom and Equality Ever Go Together in Practice?
One of the more interesting notions that most of us seem to accept at one or another point in our lives is the notion that freedom and equality are incompatible.
I have heard that notion advanced in this manner: Jones has many marketable talents, while Smith has few marketable talents. Thus, if Jones is free to make as much money as he can, he will make more money than Smith. So, for Jones and Smith to be financially equal, something must done to limit Jones' earnings. But anything you do to limit Jones' earnings deprives Jones of his freedom. Consequently, you cannot have both freedom and equality at the same time.
Now, it seems to me the notion you cannot have both freedom and equality at the same time is one of those notions that has just enough truth to it to hoodwink many of us into generalizing from such examples as "Smith and Jones" above to whole societies. However, the more one examines the notion, the less warranted that sort of generalization might seem.
The problem is history.
The rarest complex societies in history have been those in which most people were more or less free. But those rare, relatively free societies have also tended at the same time to be more egalitarian.
Tocqueville, for instance, noticed that white males living in the America of the 1830s were both freer and more equal than white males living in either the England or France of the same period. Again, both male and female citizens of the Roman Republic seem to have been both freer and more equal than their counterparts living in the Roman Empire.
So the notion that freedom and equality are incompatible, while perhaps seeming to have some reason and logic on its side, does not always pan out in practice. But if that is indeed the case, then why is it the case?
I think the reason freedom and equality often go together in practice -- if not so often in theory -- is ultimately because of human nature. Plutarch observed 2000 years ago that no republic had ever long withstood a large gap between rich and poor. It seems that whenever such a gap is allowed to exist, some of the rich inevitably use their wealth to gather to themselves the reins of power. And, because they are far richer than most anyone else, there are few if any people who can effectively oppose them. Thus, they subjugate the rest of us.
If all of that is true enough, then it follows that equality is not the enemy of freedom -- at least not in practice -- but rather its companion. For, if there is a relatively small gap between rich and poor, then comparatively more people will be in a position to effectively oppose the usurping of power by another group of people.
At least, that's my guess why history seems to show that freedom and equality often enough go together in practice. What's your guess?
I have heard that notion advanced in this manner: Jones has many marketable talents, while Smith has few marketable talents. Thus, if Jones is free to make as much money as he can, he will make more money than Smith. So, for Jones and Smith to be financially equal, something must done to limit Jones' earnings. But anything you do to limit Jones' earnings deprives Jones of his freedom. Consequently, you cannot have both freedom and equality at the same time.
Now, it seems to me the notion you cannot have both freedom and equality at the same time is one of those notions that has just enough truth to it to hoodwink many of us into generalizing from such examples as "Smith and Jones" above to whole societies. However, the more one examines the notion, the less warranted that sort of generalization might seem.
The problem is history.
The rarest complex societies in history have been those in which most people were more or less free. But those rare, relatively free societies have also tended at the same time to be more egalitarian.
Tocqueville, for instance, noticed that white males living in the America of the 1830s were both freer and more equal than white males living in either the England or France of the same period. Again, both male and female citizens of the Roman Republic seem to have been both freer and more equal than their counterparts living in the Roman Empire.
So the notion that freedom and equality are incompatible, while perhaps seeming to have some reason and logic on its side, does not always pan out in practice. But if that is indeed the case, then why is it the case?
I think the reason freedom and equality often go together in practice -- if not so often in theory -- is ultimately because of human nature. Plutarch observed 2000 years ago that no republic had ever long withstood a large gap between rich and poor. It seems that whenever such a gap is allowed to exist, some of the rich inevitably use their wealth to gather to themselves the reins of power. And, because they are far richer than most anyone else, there are few if any people who can effectively oppose them. Thus, they subjugate the rest of us.
If all of that is true enough, then it follows that equality is not the enemy of freedom -- at least not in practice -- but rather its companion. For, if there is a relatively small gap between rich and poor, then comparatively more people will be in a position to effectively oppose the usurping of power by another group of people.
At least, that's my guess why history seems to show that freedom and equality often enough go together in practice. What's your guess?
The Amazing Success of Trickle Down Economics
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About 2000 years ago, Plutarch observed, "An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics." It will be interesting to see whether America has the political will to save its republic.
Slouching Towards America's "Lost Decade"
I am re-posting the following article by Mark Weisbrot, with permission, because I think it speaks to one of the major issues facing the US -- as well as many other nations.
As you may know, the focus of the politicians has been on austerity -- cutting the budget -- despite that jobs are what most people want the politicians to focus on. Consequently, some folks are now predicting that, if the current focus continues, full employment will wait years to be achieved.
Such an outcome would be morally obscene and result in massive suffering.
The original article was first published on January 10th, in The Guardian (UK), under the heading, The Economic Idiocy of Economists. Mark Weisbrot is co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.
The American Economic Association's annual meetings are a scary sight, with thousands of economists all gathered in the same place – a veritable weapon of mass destruction. Chicago was the lucky city for 2012 this past weekend, and I had just finished participating in an interesting panel on "the economics of regime change", when I stumbled over to see what the big budget experts had to say about "the political economy of the US debt and deficits".
The session was introduced by UC Berkeley economist Alan Auerbach, who put up a graph of the United States' rising debt-to-GDP ratio, and warned of dire consequences if Congress didn't do something about it. Yawn.
But the panelists got off to a good start, with Alan Blinder of Princeton, former vice-chairman of the US Federal Reserve, describing the public discussion of the US national debt as generally ranging from "ludicrous to horrific". True, that. He asked and answered four questions.
First, is there any urgency (to reduce the deficit or debt)? No. The government can borrow short term at negative real interest rates, and long-term at about zero. The world is paying us to hold their money. That is anything but a debt crisis. The Fed is out of bullets, he said – referring to the fact that the US Federal Reserve had lowered short-term rates to zero and had used quantitative easing to help keep long-term rates low. So we need more fiscal stimulus, preferably spending that focuses on actually creating jobs. Amen.
Second, should we focus on the next decade? No, he said, and noted that the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) budget deficit projections over the next decade are about 3.6% of GDP, which is not much to get agitated about. Also true.
Third, is government spending the problem? No, he said, it's healthcare costs, and mainly the rising price of healthcare (that is, not the ageing of the population). Most important truth yet! (More on this below.)
Fourth, is the public really up in arms about the deficit? No, actually, they care more about the economy and jobs. As they should.
Blinder concluded that since this is an election year, we can forget about having any fact-based discussion of these issues in 2012. Happy New Year, he said, and the audience laughed. Well, that was refreshing, I thought – an economist telling the unvarnished truth to hundreds of his people at the annual meetings.
But a rapid descent into hell was imminent. Former CBO director Douglas Holtz-Eakin was next, talking about the need to "repair" social security and Medicare. The United States has all the characteristics of countries that run into trouble, he said. Then he warned that the US is going to end up like Greece. This is one of the dumbest things that anyone with an economics degree can say.
Hello, Mr Holtz-Eakin! Have you ever heard of the US dollar, the world's key reserve currency?
The United States is not going to end up like Greece, any sooner than it will end up like Haiti or Burkina Faso. A country that can pay its foreign public debt in its own currency and runs its own central bank does not end up like Greece.
In fact, even Japan is not going to end up like Greece, and Japan has a gross public debt of about 220% of its GDP, more than twice the size of ours and vastly larger – again, relative to its economy – than that of Greece. And the yen is nowhere near the dollar in its importance as an international reserve currency. But the Japanese government is still borrowing at just 1% interest rates for its ten-year bonds.
At this point, it was clear that this panel, other than Blinder, was living in a dystopian fantasy world. Next up was Rudy Penner of the Urban Institute, another former CBO director. His perspective was not much different from that of Auerbach or Holtz-Eakin. He complained about the polarisation of the political process, which prevents the two major parties from reaching an agreement. It's not partisanship, he said: House speaker Tip O'Neill and President Ronald Reagan knew how to be partisan, but they were able to reach agreement on the 1983 social security package and the 1986 tax reforms. And yada yada.
He might have added that we have had 25 years of lying about social security since then, and even Reagan didn't dare try to privatise social security. And, of course, social security can currently pay all promised benefits for the next 24 years without any changes.
These arguments about polarisation really pose the key issue: from the viewpoint of the 99%, it's not polarisation, but weakness in defending our interests that is the problem. President Obama compromised much more than he should have last year, offering cuts to social security and Medicare, in exchange for a long-term budget deal. The 99% are just lucky that the Republicans were too extremist to make this kind of a "grand bargain" with Obama.
The last panelist was Alice Rivlin of the Brookings Institution, another former CBO budget director and Fed vice-chair, as well as a member of the president's (2010) National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. She agreed with Blinder that we need more stimulus. But we can only get this if we agree to long-run spending cuts – including social security, of course. Yuck. This is a political strategy that is sure to end in disaster, given the prevailing state of misinformation and disinformation.
During the discussion, Blinder – who identified himself as a Democrat – expressed his frustration in not being able to convince fellow Democrats to cut social security. Double yuck. The average social security check is about $1,177 a month, and a majority of senior citizens are getting most of their meager income from social security. Why these people insist on creating more poverty among the elderly, especially when the program is solvent for decades to come, is beyond me.
I got to ask the first question for the panel. I called attention to Blinder's presentation of the long-term budget problem as almost completely a problem of the rising price of healthcare. I pointed out that you could take any country with a life expectancy greater than ours – including the other high-income countries – and put their per capita healthcare costs into our budget, and the long-term budget deficit would turn into a surplus.
My question was simple: are Americans so inherently different from other nationalities that we can't have similar healthcare costs? And if not, then why are we talking about long-term budget problems – instead of how to fix our healthcare system?
None of the panelists offered a serious answer to this question. Auerbach, the moderator, said that other countries have rising healthcare costs, too. And some of the others said or implied that healthcare costs were rising at an unsustainable pace worldwide.
But this is nonsense. The United States pays about twice as much per person for healthcare as other high-income countries – and still leaves 50 million people uninsured. This is a result of a dysfunctional healthcare system that has had healthcare prices rising much faster than those of other high-income countries for decades.
What the budget hawks are basically telling us is that we must assume that insurance and pharmaceutical companies will have a veto over the provisions of healthcare reform for decades to come. And that, therefore, we must find other ways to make up for these excessive costs, including cutting social security and other government spending, and pushing us into higher rates of poverty and inequality than we already have.
And even worse in the short run, all this crap about the deficit and the debt will be used to block the necessary stimulus measures – "stimulus" has already become a dirty word that Democratic politicians are afraid to utter. This means high unemployment and a lot of unnecessary misery in the world's richest country for the foreseeable future.
A dismal performance for the dismal science, on some of the most important issues of the day. Of course, there are other economists, including Nobel Prize winners such as Paul Krugman, Joe Stiglitz and Robert Solow (full disclosure: the latter two are members of CEPR's advisory board), who would offer more sensible views. But this panel was, sadly, representative of economists with the most influence on public policy.
With a brain trust like this, a lost decade for America looks likely – unless the citizenry can steer a different course.
Help! I am Being Assailed by a Bizarre and Shocking Notion Involved in a Theory of History!
Few things can shock the worldly epistemologist. Even those folks who insist the Red Herring is not a proper fallacy of logic must fail to scandalize the man or woman who has seen it all.
Seen the careless confusion of analytic and synthetic propositions. Seen operational definitions rise and fall in faddish favor. Seen whole and entire epistemologies come and go.
No, the most experienced epistemologists are very much like old sailors who have been to nearly every major port: Not many sights are left to shock either one of those old hands.
Yet, I must confess to being horrified by Hans-Hermann Hoppe's notions of historical truth. Horrified!
If you're like me, you must now -- despite your worldliness -- feel significantly more shocked than if someone were to suggest to you that you might someday wake up with a hang-over in a South China Sea whorehouse to find yourself in bed with a grinning orangutang -- and not a truth-table in sight! That's to say, Hoppe has suggested a notion of history no less bizarre!
So, let's put Hoppe's notion in perspective. Every science in one way or another makes use of experience to test and collaborate its hypotheses. But Hoppe is insisting that experience cannot be used to test and collaborate hypotheses in history. Why?
Well, Hoppe argues that any sequence of historical events is open to multiple, mutually exclusive interpretations, and that historical experience cannot provide a way to chose between those interpretations.
Now, if that is true -- genuinely true -- then history can tell us nothing beyond mere fact. "In the centuries following Columbus' arrival, many native Americans died from diseases of Old World origin." Presumably, Hoppe would allow that history could establish the die-off as fact.
But suppose we had an hypothesis: "The presence of Europeans in the Americas brought about a flourishing of native American well-being." According to Hoppe, no set of facts -- no matter how great their number, nor how relevant their meaning -- could ever establish that hypothesis or refute it.
That's because, for Hoppe, historical facts are always compatible with mutually exclusive interpretations of them. In other words, for his notion to be more than mere noise, Hoppe must argue that the die-off of native Americans is a fact that is just as compatible with the hypothesis, "The presence of Europeans in the Americas brought about a flourishing of native American well-being", as it is compatible with the competing hypothesis, "The presence of Europeans in the Americas brought about a decrease in native American well-being."
If he cannot show the fact of the die-off is just as compatible with the one hypothesis as it is with the other, then he cannot logically demonstrate his notion that historical experience is unable to provide a means to choose between mutually exclusive interpretations.
For that, and for other reasons, I submit that Hoppe's bizarre notion of history is mere noise.
Yet, why, if it is mere noise, does Hoppe advance his notion of history in the first place? I am largely speculating here, but I suspect Hoppe does it in order to support his political, social, and economic theories.
You see, Hoppe wants to argue that the "natural order" of humanity is a stateless society of private property owners. But what we know of history renders that notion absurd -- even more bizarre than the notion we've just discussed. So -- and here is my speculation -- Hoppe decided to redefine how hypotheses are tested in history, rather than admit his "natural order" is a joke.
Bottom Line: Regardless of his motives for them, Hoppe's ideas are bad enough that, like McDonald's "hamburgers" and Ayn Rand's "philosophy", they are bound to become popular.
Seen the careless confusion of analytic and synthetic propositions. Seen operational definitions rise and fall in faddish favor. Seen whole and entire epistemologies come and go.
No, the most experienced epistemologists are very much like old sailors who have been to nearly every major port: Not many sights are left to shock either one of those old hands.
Yet, I must confess to being horrified by Hans-Hermann Hoppe's notions of historical truth. Horrified!
- Hoppe begins his argument by asserting that history "reveals nothing about causes and effects" since "each sequence of empirical events is compatible with any number of rival, mutually incompatible interpretations."
- He then goes on, "To make a decision regarding such incompatible interpretations, we need a theory. By theory I mean a proposition whose validity does not depend on further experience but can be established a priori."
- And then he follows up his strange argument by reasserting that, "Experience may thus illustrate a theory. But historical experience can neither establish a theorem nor refute it."
If you're like me, you must now -- despite your worldliness -- feel significantly more shocked than if someone were to suggest to you that you might someday wake up with a hang-over in a South China Sea whorehouse to find yourself in bed with a grinning orangutang -- and not a truth-table in sight! That's to say, Hoppe has suggested a notion of history no less bizarre!
So, let's put Hoppe's notion in perspective. Every science in one way or another makes use of experience to test and collaborate its hypotheses. But Hoppe is insisting that experience cannot be used to test and collaborate hypotheses in history. Why?
Well, Hoppe argues that any sequence of historical events is open to multiple, mutually exclusive interpretations, and that historical experience cannot provide a way to chose between those interpretations.
Now, if that is true -- genuinely true -- then history can tell us nothing beyond mere fact. "In the centuries following Columbus' arrival, many native Americans died from diseases of Old World origin." Presumably, Hoppe would allow that history could establish the die-off as fact.
But suppose we had an hypothesis: "The presence of Europeans in the Americas brought about a flourishing of native American well-being." According to Hoppe, no set of facts -- no matter how great their number, nor how relevant their meaning -- could ever establish that hypothesis or refute it.
That's because, for Hoppe, historical facts are always compatible with mutually exclusive interpretations of them. In other words, for his notion to be more than mere noise, Hoppe must argue that the die-off of native Americans is a fact that is just as compatible with the hypothesis, "The presence of Europeans in the Americas brought about a flourishing of native American well-being", as it is compatible with the competing hypothesis, "The presence of Europeans in the Americas brought about a decrease in native American well-being."
If he cannot show the fact of the die-off is just as compatible with the one hypothesis as it is with the other, then he cannot logically demonstrate his notion that historical experience is unable to provide a means to choose between mutually exclusive interpretations.
For that, and for other reasons, I submit that Hoppe's bizarre notion of history is mere noise.
Yet, why, if it is mere noise, does Hoppe advance his notion of history in the first place? I am largely speculating here, but I suspect Hoppe does it in order to support his political, social, and economic theories.
You see, Hoppe wants to argue that the "natural order" of humanity is a stateless society of private property owners. But what we know of history renders that notion absurd -- even more bizarre than the notion we've just discussed. So -- and here is my speculation -- Hoppe decided to redefine how hypotheses are tested in history, rather than admit his "natural order" is a joke.
Bottom Line: Regardless of his motives for them, Hoppe's ideas are bad enough that, like McDonald's "hamburgers" and Ayn Rand's "philosophy", they are bound to become popular.
Where Did the Notion the Gods Care About Our Morals Come From?
I am of the tentative opinion the notion the gods care about our morals was invented by our ancestors precisely 15 minutes after they elevated from among themselves the world's first priest:
Joking aside, though, I think there might be a relationship between priests (or a priestly class) and the notion the gods are concerned with our morals.
Based on my very limited knowledge, I cannot think of a society in which the notion is prevalent that does not have priests. Although, I can think of at least one society in which I suspect the notion is either quite weak, or simply does not exist, and yet there are priests (Japan).
Moreover, as Jared Diamond somewhere points out, the New Guinea highlanders -- like many other tribal peoples -- do not think of their gods as beings interested in human morals. That is, the notion is not intrinsic to religion, and you can, and do, have religions without it.
So, do you think there might be a relationship of some sort between a presence of priests and the notion the gods are concerned with our morals? Why or why not?
ANCESTORS: "Now that we have made you the highest among us, the intermediary between us and our gods, O Priest, tell us what me must do."From such humble beginnings, the notion the gods are keenly interested in our morals eventually spread to all the nooks and niches of the earth so that, today, it is second nature for us to believe that every religion goes hand in hand with its own moral code.
PRIEST: "You must sharpen your pointy sticks for we must soon war upon the nation of the Amourites, because men with men and women with women of that nation have fornicated with each other."
ANCESTORS [embarrassed]: "Ummm...are you sure it's wrong for same sex couples to fornicate with each other? I mean, we ourselves have been....."
PRIEST: "Of course it's wrong!"
ANCESTORS: "But why? Why is it wrong?"
PRIEST: "Well, I don't actually...[suddenly has an idea]...Wait! It's because the gods forbid us to fornicate with the same sex. Yes! That's it! Because the gods forbid it!"
Joking aside, though, I think there might be a relationship between priests (or a priestly class) and the notion the gods are concerned with our morals.
Based on my very limited knowledge, I cannot think of a society in which the notion is prevalent that does not have priests. Although, I can think of at least one society in which I suspect the notion is either quite weak, or simply does not exist, and yet there are priests (Japan).
Moreover, as Jared Diamond somewhere points out, the New Guinea highlanders -- like many other tribal peoples -- do not think of their gods as beings interested in human morals. That is, the notion is not intrinsic to religion, and you can, and do, have religions without it.
So, do you think there might be a relationship of some sort between a presence of priests and the notion the gods are concerned with our morals? Why or why not?
Rick Santorum's Strange Notions of Sex and Sexuality
"One of the things I'm constantly reminding people about Rick Santorum is that he doesn't have merely an anti-gay agenda -- he has an anti-straight agenda too. He's against birth control, he's against abortion, he's against pornography, he's against all sorts of things that straight people use and enjoy frequently....You need to know, heterosexual Americans, that gay-bashing isn't his only hobby." -- Dan SavageAs long term readers of my blog know full well, I am a man of passions -- huge, towering passions -- passions that are apt to wantonly reveal themselves in my unbridled gallops through flowering fields of epistemology, in my full frontal assaults upon the castle walls of logical fallacies, in my undying lover's devotion to well-evidenced arguments. And so forth, etc. Still, it may come as some surprise to my readers that I am not entirely unfamiliar with sex. Especially if said readers have been listening to the bitter and scurrilous reports of my two ex-wives.
Because I have in the past been on intimate terms with sex (see, for instance, my treasure for newlyweds, Towards an Epistemology of Carnal Knowledge, by Paul Sunstone, Bust, Colorado: Charging Boar Books.) I sometimes take an understandably passionate interest in sex. Specifically, in:
- what people are saying about sex,
- what their reasoning is,
- and how they have arrived at their conclusions about sex.
I was at first reluctant to attempt such an examination, for I am nearly settled in the opinion that the man or woman who sets forth upon the task of extracting a reasonably logical and well-evidenced argument on sexual matters from a 21st Century American politician might as well indulge his or herself in trying to fornicate on the hop with a fleeing kangaroo.
Yet, Nance and CD finally aroused my interest by suggestively hinting that Rick Santorum might be downright promiscuous in both his fallacies and his falsehoods. And, as you know, few things have the power to titillate one's interest as do logical and factual errors.
So, one of the first things I discovered about Santorum is he seems to be best known for his opposition to gay marriage. But after a little digging, I discovered that he is also opposed to contraception.
For instance, as recently as last October, he stated in an interview with CaffeinatedThoughts.com editor Shane Vander Hart that, if elected president, he would repeal all federal funding for contraception because contraception devalues the act of procreation:
“One of the things I will talk about, that no president has talked about before, is I think the dangers of contraception in this country." And also, “It’s not okay. It’s a license to do things in a sexual realm that is counter to how things are supposed to be.” (Source)So, boiling that down, we might arrive at somewhat of an argument: Contraception is a license to do things that run counter to how things are supposed to be. Therefore we should repeal all federal funding for contraception.
However, as an argument, it fails to satisfy. Perhaps it is not penetrating enough. Or, perhaps the premiss is too vague. After all, what can you do with words like, "how things are supposed to be", besides ask for clarification?
In the same interview, Santorum also says:
[Sex] is supposed to be within marriage. It’s supposed to be for purposes that are yes, conjugal…but also procreative. That’s the perfect way that a sexual union should happen…This is special and it needs to be seen as special.I'll wager if we squint hard, we might extract an argument from that statement! An argument such as this one:
- Sex is supposed to be for purposes both conjugal and procreative.
- The perfect way to realize those purposes is within the context of a marriage.
- Therefore, sex should take place [only?] within the context of a marriage.
Let's grant, for the sake of demonstration, that "sex is supposed to be for purposes both conjugal and procreative." Let's further grant that "the perfect way to realize those purposes is within the context of a marriage." Even if we grant both premisses, the conclusion does not necessarily follow because it is conceivable that one might yet argue for sex outside of marriage as a less than perfect, but nevertheless still desirable, activity.
TUT! TUT! MR. SANTORUM! TUT! TUT!!!
I must now beg my reader's forgiveness for my sudden, emphatic outburst.
There is much else -- much else -- that could be said about Santorum's strange sexual statements. Not just the ones presented here, but statements he's made elsewhere as well. If I were to attempt to analyze them all fully, it might take several blog posts. But it's getting late, and I still have work to do before I can go to bed. However, I would like to mention one last thing.
Santorum brings up the notion that sex is for procreation. Sometime ago, I wrote on that subject. My post began:
It’s easy to believe the natural purpose of sex is reproduction. Offspring, after all, are the single most spectacular result of sex. Many of us seem bedazzled by that fact. Consequently, some of us seem to have got the notion the natural purpose of sex is reproduction and that sex without the possibility of reproduction is at best selfish indulgence and, at worse, perversion.I then sally on to bring up a few of the many reasons sex cannot be legitimately seen as solely for reproduction -- nor even as having a purpose! I recommend reading that post if you are interested in the topic. It can be found here.
Sex and Fallacious Reasoning
Like most people, I am keenly aware the reason you do not often see "sex" and "logical fallacies of relevance" in the same sentence together is because logical fallacies of relevance are intrinsically so exciting they do not need sex to sell them.
Merely mention one of the numerous fallacies of relevance -- say, the Ad Hominem Fallacy, the Red Herring Fallacy, or the Naturalistic Fallacy -- and you create an atmosphere of tingling anticipation. To toss "sex" into the mix would only be overkill.
So it may astonish my readers that I am about to
Make no mistake about it, though: I am not mixing sex withpleasure logic merely in order to titillate you, my beloved readers. Nor am I mixing sex with logic merely because I am a man of passions -- strong, huge, even alarming passions. No, there is nothing gratuitous about this. Instead, it has simply become necessary to mention the two together.
And why is that? Because someone -- someone! -- has made a mistake on the internet! That is, they have committed the Naturalistic Fallacy in the all but certain presence of impressionable children. Children who might now grow up to promiscuously introduce fallacies into the very core of their reasoning. Children who might one day run large multinational corporations, huge NGOs, entire governments, or even departments of philosophy. DOESN'T ANYONE THINK OF THE FUTURE OF OUR SPECIES BEFORE THEY COMMIT FALLACIES OF RELEVANCE ANYMORE?
The person in question -- let us call him the "perpetrator" -- committed the fallacy in the course of arguing that we should derive our morals from "evolutionary biology". Allow me to quote:
But that is precisely the form of the Naturalistic Fallacy, which can be described as, "An argument whose premises merely describe the way that the world is, but whose conclusion describes the way that the world ought to be...." The Naturalistic Fallacy is a fallacy because you cannot reason from an "is" to an "ought".
If you could reason from an "is" to an "ought", you could reason all sorts of ridiculous things. "There is theft, therefore there ought to be theft." "There are wars, therefore there ought to be wars." Even, "There are murderous fallacies of logic, therefore there ought to be murderous fallacies of logic."
Yet, for the moment, let us accept the perpetrator's reasoning, despite it's power to shock us. What, then, might happen if we were to buy into his notion that "evolutionary biology lays on us certain [moral] absolutes?
Would not any behavior with a genetic basis that increased someone's reproductive success then become moral? I cannot see why it would not.
For instance, it appears that war has a genetic basis in territorial instincts and other such things. But if that is so, then wars would be moral if they increased someone's reproductive success. Again, there is a hypothesis that rape has a genetic basis. But if that is so, then rape would be moral if it increased someone's reproductive success.
Such implications must disturb even the calmest of men and women. To permit the notion that evolutionary biology lays on us moral absolutes seems to invite a deluge of undesirable consequences. Fortunately we need not permit it, for sound logic does not compel us to permit it. For that, and for other reasons, men and women of conscience may justifiably and emphatically wag their fingers while saying to the perpetrator in the most passionate terms, "Buffoonery! Mr. Perpetrator, your notion is buffoonery!"
Merely mention one of the numerous fallacies of relevance -- say, the Ad Hominem Fallacy, the Red Herring Fallacy, or the Naturalistic Fallacy -- and you create an atmosphere of tingling anticipation. To toss "sex" into the mix would only be overkill.
So it may astonish my readers that I am about to
Make no mistake about it, though: I am not mixing sex with
And why is that? Because someone -- someone! -- has made a mistake on the internet! That is, they have committed the Naturalistic Fallacy in the all but certain presence of impressionable children. Children who might now grow up to promiscuously introduce fallacies into the very core of their reasoning. Children who might one day run large multinational corporations, huge NGOs, entire governments, or even departments of philosophy. DOESN'T ANYONE THINK OF THE FUTURE OF OUR SPECIES BEFORE THEY COMMIT FALLACIES OF RELEVANCE ANYMORE?
The person in question -- let us call him the "perpetrator" -- committed the fallacy in the course of arguing that we should derive our morals from "evolutionary biology". Allow me to quote:
My position is that evolutionary biology lays on us certain [moral] absolutes. These are adaptations brought on by natural selection to make us functioning social beings. It is in this sense that I claim that morality is not subjective. [bracketed material mine]As it happens, there is more than one way to lay out his argument. In the spirit of good sportsmanship, I shall now lay out the perpetrator's argument in the strongest possible manner I can come up with, despite the risk of giving us all the vapours:
- We evolved various behaviors ("adaptations") that make us functioning social beings.
- Because the evolved behaviors ("adaptations") make us functioning social beings, they are moral absolutes.
- We ought to behave according to moral absolutes.
- Therefore, we ought to behave according to the various behaviors ("adaptations") that make us functioning social beings.
But that is precisely the form of the Naturalistic Fallacy, which can be described as, "An argument whose premises merely describe the way that the world is, but whose conclusion describes the way that the world ought to be...." The Naturalistic Fallacy is a fallacy because you cannot reason from an "is" to an "ought".
If you could reason from an "is" to an "ought", you could reason all sorts of ridiculous things. "There is theft, therefore there ought to be theft." "There are wars, therefore there ought to be wars." Even, "There are murderous fallacies of logic, therefore there ought to be murderous fallacies of logic."
Yet, for the moment, let us accept the perpetrator's reasoning, despite it's power to shock us. What, then, might happen if we were to buy into his notion that "evolutionary biology lays on us certain [moral] absolutes?
Would not any behavior with a genetic basis that increased someone's reproductive success then become moral? I cannot see why it would not.
For instance, it appears that war has a genetic basis in territorial instincts and other such things. But if that is so, then wars would be moral if they increased someone's reproductive success. Again, there is a hypothesis that rape has a genetic basis. But if that is so, then rape would be moral if it increased someone's reproductive success.
Such implications must disturb even the calmest of men and women. To permit the notion that evolutionary biology lays on us moral absolutes seems to invite a deluge of undesirable consequences. Fortunately we need not permit it, for sound logic does not compel us to permit it. For that, and for other reasons, men and women of conscience may justifiably and emphatically wag their fingers while saying to the perpetrator in the most passionate terms, "Buffoonery! Mr. Perpetrator, your notion is buffoonery!"
What Causes Us to Think Immodest Women are the Downfall of Men?
Perhaps we can discuss once more the curious notion that immodest women are the downfall of men? But I am not so concerned today with refuting the notion. It seems to me an irrational notion -- and, as a friend likes to remind me, you cannot reason a person out of a notion they did not reason themselves into in the first place. So, instead of discussing its reasonableness, I would like to take a guess at its possible origins or causes.
It is a serious question why such an unwholesome notion is spread over several cultures and why it can be found in countries as diverse as India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and America. Taking its strangely ubiquitous nature into account, is there any universal root for the notion that would explain why it appears in both India and Israel, in both Saudi Arabia and America, and -- apparently -- in most other countries?
I know of very little science on this issue, but I seem to recall one hypotheses: At root, the notion that immodest women are the downfall of men is part of a male strategy -- a tactic, if you will -- to put men in control of women's reproductive choices.
Sometimes the hypothesis is reasoned this way:
For the sake of discussion, let's now assume the hypothesis is sound. That is, the notion immodest women cause the downfall of men is a tactic men employ to assist them in controlling women's reproductive choices. Does that mean that every time we hear some man encourage some woman to "be more modest" we can be confident he is doing so to control her reproductive choices?
I don't think so. I think the hypothesis, if it is sound at all, would at best explain why the notion ever caught on, why it persists, and why it became nearly ubiquitous in its distribution. That is, it might explain the majority of cases. But as for explaining the behavior of any one person, I think it's quite likely that a significant minority of people who encourage women to be modest do so for reasons having nothing to do with the hypothesis.
For instance, I came across a comment left on a blog yesterday by a teenager that asked women to dress modestly for two reasons. First, to help the comment's author avoid masturbation. Second, to help its author avoid objectifying women.
Now, you might grin at that (as did I), but if we take his two reasons at face value, we have there a male who is asking women to "be more modest" for reasons other than to restrict women's reproductive choices. So, I think it would take a lot of work to sort out all the reasons people might have for the belief that immodest women are the downfall of men. But what do you yourself think might be the reasons or causes of such a heavy, gloomy, and unhealthy notion?
It is a serious question why such an unwholesome notion is spread over several cultures and why it can be found in countries as diverse as India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and America. Taking its strangely ubiquitous nature into account, is there any universal root for the notion that would explain why it appears in both India and Israel, in both Saudi Arabia and America, and -- apparently -- in most other countries?
I know of very little science on this issue, but I seem to recall one hypotheses: At root, the notion that immodest women are the downfall of men is part of a male strategy -- a tactic, if you will -- to put men in control of women's reproductive choices.
Sometimes the hypothesis is reasoned this way:
(1) Women, when they have the freedom to choose their own mates, typically go about that task by a process of attraction and selection. Basically, they make themselves as attractive to men as needed -- especially as physically attractive as needed -- and then they select a mate from among the men who are attracted to them.
(2) Given that women most frequently exercise choice by a process of attraction and selection, men have a number of options if they want to control women's reproductive choices. Those options include placing restrictions on a woman's freedom to make herself attractive. Such restrictions might include requiring her to dress in a manner that hides her physical attractiveness; requiring her to walk with eyes downcast; requiring her to speak of herself "modestly" or dismissively; prohibiting her from asking a man for a date; etc.
(3) The notion that immodest women cause a man's downfall is thus seen to be a cover, mask, or rationalization for controlling women's reproductive choices by restricting their ability to attract mates.
(4) Men who succeed in controlling women's reproductive choices thus place themselves in a better position to make those choices for women. And if they can make those choices for women, they will presumably make them most frequently for their (the men's) own benefit.
For the sake of discussion, let's now assume the hypothesis is sound. That is, the notion immodest women cause the downfall of men is a tactic men employ to assist them in controlling women's reproductive choices. Does that mean that every time we hear some man encourage some woman to "be more modest" we can be confident he is doing so to control her reproductive choices?
I don't think so. I think the hypothesis, if it is sound at all, would at best explain why the notion ever caught on, why it persists, and why it became nearly ubiquitous in its distribution. That is, it might explain the majority of cases. But as for explaining the behavior of any one person, I think it's quite likely that a significant minority of people who encourage women to be modest do so for reasons having nothing to do with the hypothesis.
For instance, I came across a comment left on a blog yesterday by a teenager that asked women to dress modestly for two reasons. First, to help the comment's author avoid masturbation. Second, to help its author avoid objectifying women.
Now, you might grin at that (as did I), but if we take his two reasons at face value, we have there a male who is asking women to "be more modest" for reasons other than to restrict women's reproductive choices. So, I think it would take a lot of work to sort out all the reasons people might have for the belief that immodest women are the downfall of men. But what do you yourself think might be the reasons or causes of such a heavy, gloomy, and unhealthy notion?
Should We Legalize Polygamy?
Although I fancy myself a man of passions -- even strong passions -- loyal, experienced readers of this blog are sure to know that few issues -- no matter how controversial -- are likely to give me the vapours (except, of course, egregious mistakes in the noble field of epistemology). Therefore, it might come as something of a shock when I confess that the issue of legalizing polygamy has all but reduced me to my smelling salts.
The problem, you see, is I can't make up my mind whether I am for or against the legalization.
On the one hand, I can think of at least two powerful arguments for the legalization:
In 2010, the Supreme Court of British Columbia was asked to reconsider a ban on plural marriage. The core issue was whether polygamy was bad for society. That is, whether anyone besides the partners to a polygamous marriage were harmed by it.
As part of its deliberations, the Supreme Court called upon the expertise of Joseph Henrich, an inter-disciplinary professor whose scientific credentials are so extensive they require 17 pages to list and are of such quality as would be lightly dismissed only by a madman or a Republican candidate for the presidency. That's not to say Henrich is above being wrong -- for who among us is -- but only to suggest his findings might be worth some consideration by reasonable folk.
Before being called upon by the Court, Henrich had never published on polygamy nor formed any reasoned and evidenced opinion of it. However, after reviewing a large body of evidence from several fields -- including psychology, anthropology, sociology, and economics -- he reached several provisional conclusions. His conclusions, however, dealt with only one aspect of polygamy -- polygyny, or the marriage of a man to multiple wives (.pdf pp. 25):
That is, he suggests that monogamy -- which is historically much rarer among our societies than polygyny -- might be linked to democracy and gender equality (.pdf pp. 64): "Historically, we know that universal monogamous marriage preceded the emergence of democratic institutions in Europe, and the rise of notions of equality between the sexes." The idea there might be a relationship between monogamy and social and political equality is intriguing, although I gather much more work would need to be done for the claim to be reasonably evidenced.
Now, I myself am a polyamorous individual. I have experienced at least three great loves in my life -- women I have been inordinately passionate about -- women who, at times, I have even loved more deeply and truly than ever I loved a well-formulated operational definition. Consequently, I'm conflicted by Henrich's findings.
Fortunately, I never had to choose between one of those loves and another since several years separated each from the other. But I can imagine how cruel it would have been had I been forced to choose. Yet -- if Henrich is right -- the consequences of legalizing polygyny seem to me dire enough to warrant the ban of it.
What do you think? Should we legalize polygyny? Why or why not? And, just out of curiosity, have you ever found yourself profoundly in love with two people at once?
The problem, you see, is I can't make up my mind whether I am for or against the legalization.
On the one hand, I can think of at least two powerful arguments for the legalization:
- As a general principle, I favor allowing informed, consenting adults to choose whatever marriage arrangements they deem best for themselves. By the same token, I believe that the marriage arrangements of informed, consenting adults should not be restricted -- unless a weight of reason and evidence demonstrates those arrangements to be injurious to others.
- It has been my experience that a person can have more than one great love in his or her life. But to restrict marriage to two people would seem to force some people to cruelly reject or deny at least one of their loves. Consequently, I believe restricting marriage to only two people should never be done for light and transient reasons -- but only for the soundest of reasons.
In 2010, the Supreme Court of British Columbia was asked to reconsider a ban on plural marriage. The core issue was whether polygamy was bad for society. That is, whether anyone besides the partners to a polygamous marriage were harmed by it.
As part of its deliberations, the Supreme Court called upon the expertise of Joseph Henrich, an inter-disciplinary professor whose scientific credentials are so extensive they require 17 pages to list and are of such quality as would be lightly dismissed only by a madman or a Republican candidate for the presidency. That's not to say Henrich is above being wrong -- for who among us is -- but only to suggest his findings might be worth some consideration by reasonable folk.
Before being called upon by the Court, Henrich had never published on polygamy nor formed any reasoned and evidenced opinion of it. However, after reviewing a large body of evidence from several fields -- including psychology, anthropology, sociology, and economics -- he reached several provisional conclusions. His conclusions, however, dealt with only one aspect of polygamy -- polygyny, or the marriage of a man to multiple wives (.pdf pp. 25):
- A non-trivial increase in the incidence of polygyny, which is quite possible if polygyny were legalized given what we know about both male and female mating preferences, would result in increased crime and antisocial behavior by the pool of unmarried males it would create.
- Greater degrees of polygyny drive down the age of first marriage for (all) females on average, and increase the age gap between husbands and wives. This generally leads to females marrying before age 18, or being "promised" in marriage before age 18.
- Greater degrees of polygyny are associated with increased inequality between the sexes, and the relationship may be causal as men seek more control over women when women become scarce.
- Polygynous men invest less in their offspring both because they have more offspring and because they continue to invest in seeking additional wives. This implies that, on average, children in a more polygynous society will receive less parental investment.
- Greater degrees of polygynous marriage may reduce national wealth (GDP) per capita both because of the manner in which male efforts are shifted to obtaining more wives and because of the increase in female fertility.
That is, he suggests that monogamy -- which is historically much rarer among our societies than polygyny -- might be linked to democracy and gender equality (.pdf pp. 64): "Historically, we know that universal monogamous marriage preceded the emergence of democratic institutions in Europe, and the rise of notions of equality between the sexes." The idea there might be a relationship between monogamy and social and political equality is intriguing, although I gather much more work would need to be done for the claim to be reasonably evidenced.
Now, I myself am a polyamorous individual. I have experienced at least three great loves in my life -- women I have been inordinately passionate about -- women who, at times, I have even loved more deeply and truly than ever I loved a well-formulated operational definition. Consequently, I'm conflicted by Henrich's findings.
Fortunately, I never had to choose between one of those loves and another since several years separated each from the other. But I can imagine how cruel it would have been had I been forced to choose. Yet -- if Henrich is right -- the consequences of legalizing polygyny seem to me dire enough to warrant the ban of it.
What do you think? Should we legalize polygyny? Why or why not? And, just out of curiosity, have you ever found yourself profoundly in love with two people at once?
Do You Have Any Idea How Pissed Off I Am?
Do you know how pissed off I am?
As it happens, I am at this very moment pissed off enough to say, "intersubjective verifiability is the core of the empirical sciences" -- say it and mean it!
That's how pissed off I am.
I have just come from a kerfuffle. Someone (the nerve of that person! The Nerve!) at this very moment is -- despite my protests -- asserting that "objectivity is the core of the empirical sciences". And they are saying it on the internet -- on the internet, where impressionable children might see it and thus have warped their tender, young epistemologies!
Please allow me to quote the fool: "The basis for science is objectivity, yet the foundational premise for science is based on an assumption (existence of objects)."
DOESN'T ANYONE THINK THROUGH THEIR TERMS THESE DAYS?
I humbly apologize if the sheer emotional violence of my response to that person has caused you to reach for the smelling salts. I realize I am a man of passions. Strong passions. And that sometimes my passions might be a tad overwhelming, especially when an epistemology is involved. But please bear with me while I say this: It is a myth -- it is only a myth -- that in order to do science I must believe in an objective reality. I am, of course, permitted to believe in an objective reality. But my belief in an objective reality is not necessary because I can do science even if I do not believe in an objective reality.
I myself favor throwing the concept of objectivity out the door. We don't need it. It is unnecessary baggage, and it reeks of the Middle Ages. Moreover, the concept of objectivity is quite easily and very soundly replaced by the concept of intersubjective verifiability.
All of us intersubjectively verify things -- even if we do not call it "intersubjective verification". Someone tells us something is true and we say, "Show me!" In a nutshell, that's the principle behind intersubjective verification.
Suppose I say to you, "It is snowing outside." You look out the window, see snow, and say, "So it is!" You have just intersubjectively verified my statement, "It is snowing outside."
Again, you say to me, "If you run an electric spark through a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen, the mixture will explode, after which, you will be left with some water." I don't believe you. So I experiment by running an electric spark through a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen. The mixture explodes, after which I notice some water. I have just intersubjectively verified your claim.
Imagine thousands of people do the same experiment and almost all of them get significantly the same results. Would we not have considerable evidence -- a weight of evidence -- that we can rely on a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen to produce water when a spark is passed through it? I think so. But have we in any way demonstrated there is some objective world out there -- a world separate from our awareness -- in which hydrogen and oxygen are real things that produce real water when a real spark is passed through them?
Strictly speaking, we have not.
Yet -- and this has a certain beauty to it -- we don't need to. We do not need to figure out with absolute certainty what the ultimate nature of reality is before we can arrive at reliable facts through processes of intersubjective verification. For example, we can discover that a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen reliably produces water when a spark is passed through it without ever needing to speculate about metaphysics.
In short, science does not crucially rest upon the metaphysical notion that objects really exist.
So take that, Mr. Internet-Child-Corrupting-"The-Basis-For-Science-Is-Objectivity"-Poo-Poo-Head-Man!
Once again, I must apologize to you, my dear readers, on the chance that my strong, vigorous language has caused you to reach for your smelling salts.
As it happens, I am at this very moment pissed off enough to say, "intersubjective verifiability is the core of the empirical sciences" -- say it and mean it!
That's how pissed off I am.
I have just come from a kerfuffle. Someone (the nerve of that person! The Nerve!) at this very moment is -- despite my protests -- asserting that "objectivity is the core of the empirical sciences". And they are saying it on the internet -- on the internet, where impressionable children might see it and thus have warped their tender, young epistemologies!
Please allow me to quote the fool: "The basis for science is objectivity, yet the foundational premise for science is based on an assumption (existence of objects)."
DOESN'T ANYONE THINK THROUGH THEIR TERMS THESE DAYS?
I humbly apologize if the sheer emotional violence of my response to that person has caused you to reach for the smelling salts. I realize I am a man of passions. Strong passions. And that sometimes my passions might be a tad overwhelming, especially when an epistemology is involved. But please bear with me while I say this: It is a myth -- it is only a myth -- that in order to do science I must believe in an objective reality. I am, of course, permitted to believe in an objective reality. But my belief in an objective reality is not necessary because I can do science even if I do not believe in an objective reality.
I myself favor throwing the concept of objectivity out the door. We don't need it. It is unnecessary baggage, and it reeks of the Middle Ages. Moreover, the concept of objectivity is quite easily and very soundly replaced by the concept of intersubjective verifiability.
All of us intersubjectively verify things -- even if we do not call it "intersubjective verification". Someone tells us something is true and we say, "Show me!" In a nutshell, that's the principle behind intersubjective verification.
Suppose I say to you, "It is snowing outside." You look out the window, see snow, and say, "So it is!" You have just intersubjectively verified my statement, "It is snowing outside."
Again, you say to me, "If you run an electric spark through a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen, the mixture will explode, after which, you will be left with some water." I don't believe you. So I experiment by running an electric spark through a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen. The mixture explodes, after which I notice some water. I have just intersubjectively verified your claim.
Imagine thousands of people do the same experiment and almost all of them get significantly the same results. Would we not have considerable evidence -- a weight of evidence -- that we can rely on a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen to produce water when a spark is passed through it? I think so. But have we in any way demonstrated there is some objective world out there -- a world separate from our awareness -- in which hydrogen and oxygen are real things that produce real water when a real spark is passed through them?
Strictly speaking, we have not.
Yet -- and this has a certain beauty to it -- we don't need to. We do not need to figure out with absolute certainty what the ultimate nature of reality is before we can arrive at reliable facts through processes of intersubjective verification. For example, we can discover that a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen reliably produces water when a spark is passed through it without ever needing to speculate about metaphysics.
In short, science does not crucially rest upon the metaphysical notion that objects really exist.
So take that, Mr. Internet-Child-Corrupting-"The-Basis-For-Science-Is-Objectivity"-Poo-Poo-Head-Man!
Once again, I must apologize to you, my dear readers, on the chance that my strong, vigorous language has caused you to reach for your smelling salts.
My High School Math Teacher Was A Space Alien!
I am fascinated -- I have long been fascinated -- that the same person can be smart in some ways and stupid in others.
If I were a scientist with an adequate research budget, I would probably want to study human intelligence just to find out what I could about that one unexpected fact. (Of course, if I were a scientist and I had an adequate research budget, that, too, would be an unexpected fact.) How can the same person be both smart and stupid?
I don't know a reliable answer to that question, but I do think many of us -- perhaps even most of us -- more or less fit the description of being smart in some ways and stupid in others. And those of us who do not fit that description seem more often stupid in everything than smart in everything.
I'm aware of Gardner's Theory of Multiple Intelligences. And his theory would seem to explain why the same person can be smart in some ways and stupid in other ways. Yet, so far as I know, Gardner's theory is as yet unsupported by much in the way of hard evidence. Consequently, I remain an agnostic about it.
Often, when I think of the people in my life who have most deeply -- some might say "most traumatically" -- impressed me as smart in some ways and stupid in others, I think of my high school math teacher, Mr. B.
No one -- not even I -- questioned Mr. B's competence as a mathematician. I will submit, however, that Mr. B, despite his smarts in math, was twenty years ahead of his time in some kinds of stupid.
I had Mr. B as a teacher in the early 1970s. William F. Buckley was alive, and Buckley was frequently a very smart man. He also had the clout to be the intellectual guardian of the Republican Party. That is, if he decided someone or some group was too stupid to fit in as a Republican, Buckley would use his considerable influence to exile them from the Party. The Republicans have no one like him today. Today,. the crazies have become the Party.
The John Birch Society was one of the groups Buckley succeeded in kicking out of the Party. The "Birchers" believed -- in the way stupid people fanatically believe things -- all sorts of nonsense. For instance, they thought Dwight D. Eisenhower was a willing tool of the Soviet Union and a deliberate traitor to America. Buckley thought the Birchers were in danger of sliding into fascism. Perhaps he was right.
My math teacher subscribed to the John Birch Society, and perhaps to other Radical Right organizations as well. We knew whenever he had received in the mail another one of their newsletters -- he would put aside teaching mathematics for the day and instead lecture us on themes that were rarely enough heard in the early 1970s outside of certain circles.
I can still recall a few of his more memorable pronouncements: "Pollution never killed anyone". "Martin Luther King, Jr. was a Communist out to destroy America. Don't let anyone tell you different." "The Soviets will invade us any year now. Maybe any day now." "Women don't need equal rights. Men do! Women are smarter than men." "Negroes are shameless whiners. They haven't been discriminated against since the end of the Civil War."
I am a strong believer in the notion that, although everyone has a right to his or her opinions, not all opinions are created equal. Some opinions are forged of sound logic and a weight of evidence. Some other opinions are forged of logical fallacies and bullshit. Many people believe that differences of opinion never reflect differences of intellect. I disagree. Some opinions are so stupid their owners, if not merely ignorant, must be stupid.
Yet, it is simply true that -- often enough -- the same one of us who is so stupid as to believe the Theory of Evolution is a conspiracy of the world's 500,000 biologists, is nevertheless a brilliant (or at least competent) engineer. How can we account for that?
Mr. B once said something that I think is about half true: “No matter how good you get at math, you will never cease to make mistakes. But if you practice, you will catch your mistakes as you make them, and then correct them yourself, instead of needing someone else to correct them for you.”
I think it sometimes happens that way. But I also think very few -- if any -- of us ever get so good that we catch and correct every one of our own mistakes, whether in math or in any other field. We will always need the help of others. Indeed, it seems one reason the sciences have been so successful at establishing reliable facts and producing predictive theories is because they employ methods of inquiry that encourage people to correct each other's mistakes. That is, science is a profoundly cooperative endeavor.
Buckley once described some of the notions of the John Birch society as "paranoid and idiotic". To some extent, those two things go together. A "paranoid" person is typically unwilling to accept anyone correcting his ideas. Quite often, the result is his ideas drift into idiocy. That's to say, it seems one of the best ways to become stupid is to systematically reject or ignore the efforts of others to correct us when we are wrong.
But why are we humans so often wrong in the first place?
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have come up with a rather interesting theory that could go far to explain why our species of great ape seems prone to cognitive errors. It's called "The Argumentative Theory", and it is well worth reading up on.
The gist of it is that our ability to reason evolved -- not to figure out what is true or false -- but to win arguments, or to persuade others to do what we want them to do. Consequently, our ability to think logically and evidentially is imperfect -- one might even say, "somewhat remedial".
Part of the evidence for the Argumentative Theory is our species built in cognitive biases. By "built in", I mean that the biases seem hereditary. The fact our thinking is inherently biased is strong evidence our thinking evolved for some other function than to merely figure out what is true or false. Mercier and Sperber would say that function was to persuade people.
Regardless of whether the function of reason is to discern reality or to win arguments, the fact our species is so prone to cognitive error might go far in explaining how it happens that the same person can be smart in some ways and stupid in others. That is, perhaps we are smartest -- or at least, we tend to act smartest -- when we have some corrective feedback.
That feedback might come in the form of ourselves "checking our work" -- as when we check a mathematical solution. It might come in the form of whether we achieve our intended outcome -- as when we fix a car so that it runs again. Or the corrective feedback might come in the form of constructive criticism from others.
Perhaps the less corrective feedback we have, the more likely we are to adopt stupid opinions. Or, in other words, we should not expect our own reason alone to take us where we want to go. Rather, we should expect our reason plus some form of corrective feedback to take us there.
I think my high school math teacher, if he were alive to read this essay, would be appalled by my suggestion that -- no matter how good we get -- we are still wise to listen to the critiques of others. It seems to me Mr. B cared so little to hear the opinions of others that he might as well have been a space alien orbiting his own little planet and all but totally out of touch with earth. He seemed to think he was his own sufficient critic. And perhaps his lack of concern for the input of others explains why he found it so easy to harbor so many "paranoid and idiotic" notions. Notions that, in a sense, were more stupid than he was.
If I were a scientist with an adequate research budget, I would probably want to study human intelligence just to find out what I could about that one unexpected fact. (Of course, if I were a scientist and I had an adequate research budget, that, too, would be an unexpected fact.) How can the same person be both smart and stupid?
I don't know a reliable answer to that question, but I do think many of us -- perhaps even most of us -- more or less fit the description of being smart in some ways and stupid in others. And those of us who do not fit that description seem more often stupid in everything than smart in everything.
I'm aware of Gardner's Theory of Multiple Intelligences. And his theory would seem to explain why the same person can be smart in some ways and stupid in other ways. Yet, so far as I know, Gardner's theory is as yet unsupported by much in the way of hard evidence. Consequently, I remain an agnostic about it.
Often, when I think of the people in my life who have most deeply -- some might say "most traumatically" -- impressed me as smart in some ways and stupid in others, I think of my high school math teacher, Mr. B.
No one -- not even I -- questioned Mr. B's competence as a mathematician. I will submit, however, that Mr. B, despite his smarts in math, was twenty years ahead of his time in some kinds of stupid.
I had Mr. B as a teacher in the early 1970s. William F. Buckley was alive, and Buckley was frequently a very smart man. He also had the clout to be the intellectual guardian of the Republican Party. That is, if he decided someone or some group was too stupid to fit in as a Republican, Buckley would use his considerable influence to exile them from the Party. The Republicans have no one like him today. Today,. the crazies have become the Party.
The John Birch Society was one of the groups Buckley succeeded in kicking out of the Party. The "Birchers" believed -- in the way stupid people fanatically believe things -- all sorts of nonsense. For instance, they thought Dwight D. Eisenhower was a willing tool of the Soviet Union and a deliberate traitor to America. Buckley thought the Birchers were in danger of sliding into fascism. Perhaps he was right.
My math teacher subscribed to the John Birch Society, and perhaps to other Radical Right organizations as well. We knew whenever he had received in the mail another one of their newsletters -- he would put aside teaching mathematics for the day and instead lecture us on themes that were rarely enough heard in the early 1970s outside of certain circles.
I can still recall a few of his more memorable pronouncements: "Pollution never killed anyone". "Martin Luther King, Jr. was a Communist out to destroy America. Don't let anyone tell you different." "The Soviets will invade us any year now. Maybe any day now." "Women don't need equal rights. Men do! Women are smarter than men." "Negroes are shameless whiners. They haven't been discriminated against since the end of the Civil War."
I am a strong believer in the notion that, although everyone has a right to his or her opinions, not all opinions are created equal. Some opinions are forged of sound logic and a weight of evidence. Some other opinions are forged of logical fallacies and bullshit. Many people believe that differences of opinion never reflect differences of intellect. I disagree. Some opinions are so stupid their owners, if not merely ignorant, must be stupid.
Yet, it is simply true that -- often enough -- the same one of us who is so stupid as to believe the Theory of Evolution is a conspiracy of the world's 500,000 biologists, is nevertheless a brilliant (or at least competent) engineer. How can we account for that?
Mr. B once said something that I think is about half true: “No matter how good you get at math, you will never cease to make mistakes. But if you practice, you will catch your mistakes as you make them, and then correct them yourself, instead of needing someone else to correct them for you.”
I think it sometimes happens that way. But I also think very few -- if any -- of us ever get so good that we catch and correct every one of our own mistakes, whether in math or in any other field. We will always need the help of others. Indeed, it seems one reason the sciences have been so successful at establishing reliable facts and producing predictive theories is because they employ methods of inquiry that encourage people to correct each other's mistakes. That is, science is a profoundly cooperative endeavor.
Buckley once described some of the notions of the John Birch society as "paranoid and idiotic". To some extent, those two things go together. A "paranoid" person is typically unwilling to accept anyone correcting his ideas. Quite often, the result is his ideas drift into idiocy. That's to say, it seems one of the best ways to become stupid is to systematically reject or ignore the efforts of others to correct us when we are wrong.
But why are we humans so often wrong in the first place?
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have come up with a rather interesting theory that could go far to explain why our species of great ape seems prone to cognitive errors. It's called "The Argumentative Theory", and it is well worth reading up on.
The gist of it is that our ability to reason evolved -- not to figure out what is true or false -- but to win arguments, or to persuade others to do what we want them to do. Consequently, our ability to think logically and evidentially is imperfect -- one might even say, "somewhat remedial".
Part of the evidence for the Argumentative Theory is our species built in cognitive biases. By "built in", I mean that the biases seem hereditary. The fact our thinking is inherently biased is strong evidence our thinking evolved for some other function than to merely figure out what is true or false. Mercier and Sperber would say that function was to persuade people.
Regardless of whether the function of reason is to discern reality or to win arguments, the fact our species is so prone to cognitive error might go far in explaining how it happens that the same person can be smart in some ways and stupid in others. That is, perhaps we are smartest -- or at least, we tend to act smartest -- when we have some corrective feedback.
That feedback might come in the form of ourselves "checking our work" -- as when we check a mathematical solution. It might come in the form of whether we achieve our intended outcome -- as when we fix a car so that it runs again. Or the corrective feedback might come in the form of constructive criticism from others.
Perhaps the less corrective feedback we have, the more likely we are to adopt stupid opinions. Or, in other words, we should not expect our own reason alone to take us where we want to go. Rather, we should expect our reason plus some form of corrective feedback to take us there.
I think my high school math teacher, if he were alive to read this essay, would be appalled by my suggestion that -- no matter how good we get -- we are still wise to listen to the critiques of others. It seems to me Mr. B cared so little to hear the opinions of others that he might as well have been a space alien orbiting his own little planet and all but totally out of touch with earth. He seemed to think he was his own sufficient critic. And perhaps his lack of concern for the input of others explains why he found it so easy to harbor so many "paranoid and idiotic" notions. Notions that, in a sense, were more stupid than he was.
Jennfier Keeton: Playing the Christ Card
Jennifer Keeton was until recently a graduate student in counseling at Augusta State University in Georgia. About 18 months ago, she sued the University, saying that it had violated her rights to free speech and the free exercise of her Christian faith.
Among other things, Keeton claimed University officials had told her that, in order to stay in the University's school counseling program, she would have to change her beliefs about homosexuality. According to Court documents (.pdf pp.5-6):
As it happened, though, a three judge panel for the 11th Circuit Court of Appeal found Keeton was mistaken to claim the University had asked her to change her beliefs. Instead, the University had only asked her to adhere to a certain professional code of ethics.
The school counseling program at Augusta State University is accredited by an organization with the exciting name of, "The Council for Accreditation of Counseling and Related Educational Programs (CACREP)" As part of the accreditation deal, the University agreed to teach its counseling students to professionally conduct themselves according to the American Counseling Association’s (ACA) Code of Ethics. The Code includes ethical principles such as (.pdf pp. 6-7):
There are quite a few details to the case, but in effect, the University asked Jennifer Keeton to professionally conduct herself according to the ACA Code of Ethics and she refused to so.
Some years ago, I paid for my college room and board by working as a fire fighter. I do not now recall that we ever -- even once -- asked someone about their sexual orientation before knocking down their fire or extracting them from their wrecked car. More to the point: Had I decided back then that I would only provide my services to heterosexuals, I would have been (justifiably) fired. But the judges of the 11th Circuit said it best (.pdf pp. 30):
In order to secure preferential treatment, she cynically tried to play the Christ Card. That is, she deceitfully tried to fob herself off as -- not some jerk seeking preferential treatment -- but someone wrongfully oppressed because she is a Christian.
Of course, some folks are now tripping over themselves in their rush to buy into Jennifer Keeton's notion of herself as a martyr. Here is what they have been saying...
Ramona Hicks Willis thinks, "This is not a questions of ethics, it is a power play by the homosexuals. They want to destroy anyone that does not agree with their lifestyle. Plain and simple."
The Court's ruling in the case seems to have traumatized Diana Shugar, who is suddenly ready to give up on life: "God is not the god of this world; Satan is. Satan is the invisible god of this world. He is the author of its organization, its basic philosophies, its systems of government, business, society—yes, AND RELIGIONS! It's best to just tell people of the new upcoming world ruled by our Lord and Savior. This one is beyond redemption."
Michael Galvin fully agrees with Diana that requiring Jennifer Keeton to live up to a professional code of ethics is so traumatizing the end of the world must be near: "You are right. We cannot save this world and the people in it. God desires that none would perish, but they have rejected Him and His Gospel. The date it set, the orchestra is in tune, the curtain is soon to be lifted."
Adrienne Elizabeth Crawford cannot believe Keeton did anything wrong. Apparently, she just doesn't get what the case was all about. Nevertheless, she's sure it has something to do with the way Christians are always being persecuted: "It’s just really sad that this woman is being reprimanded (so to speak) for her beliefs. We ALL have a right to our own beliefs. I don’t believe she did anything wrong. But we as Christians should not be surprised by this persecution. After all, we live in Satan’s world. He’s the Prince of this world but only temporarily."
Tolfe Lee Albert thinks working with gay kids is a lot like risking your life -- or at least your health (he's not sure which): "What if the student had AIDS, or a very bad cold...would she not have the right to refuse that student? Where are HER rights. Another victory for the ACLU and loss of our personal rights and dignity."
Last, Jack Oliver thinks he knows the sacred duty of a true Christian: "As a christan [sic] she is bound to speak up against queres [sic]."
Jennifer Keeton played the Christ Card by demanding special privileges for herself while shouting that she was being discriminated against. Naturally -- inevitably -- some folks bought her story. But it would be a mistake to assume -- simply because some Christians have uncritically bought Keeton's story -- that the majority of Christians in America agree with them, for there is no evidence that the majority do in fact agree with the poor fools among us.
(H/T: Chappie at An Apostate's Chapel)
Among other things, Keeton claimed University officials had told her that, in order to stay in the University's school counseling program, she would have to change her beliefs about homosexuality. According to Court documents (.pdf pp.5-6):
In Keeton's view, the University was asking her to change her beliefs, and thus violating both her right to free speech and her right to freely practice her religion.[Keeton] holds several beliefs about homosexuality that she views as arising from her Christian faith. She believes that “sexual behavior is the result of personal choice for which individuals are accountable, not inevitable deterministic forces; that gender is fixed and binary (i.e., male or female), not a social construct
or personal choice subject to individual change; and that homosexuality is a ‘lifestyle,’ not a ‘state of being.’” ASU’s officials became aware that Keeton held these beliefs when she expressed to professors in class and fellow classmates in and out of class that she believed that the GLBTQ population suffers from identity confusion, and that she intended to attempt to convert students from being homosexual to heterosexual. Keeton also said that it would be difficult for her to work with GLBTQ clients and to separate her views about homosexuality from her clients’ views. Further, in answering a hypothetical posed by a faculty member, Keeton responded that as a high school counselor confronted by a sophomore student in crisis, questioning his sexual orientation, she would tell the student that it was not okay to be gay. Similarly, Keeton told a fellow classmate that, if a client discloses that he is gay, it was her intention to tell the client that his behavior is morally wrong and then try to change the client’s behavior, and if she were unable to help the client change his behavior, she would refer him to someone practicing conversion therapy.
As it happened, though, a three judge panel for the 11th Circuit Court of Appeal found Keeton was mistaken to claim the University had asked her to change her beliefs. Instead, the University had only asked her to adhere to a certain professional code of ethics.
The school counseling program at Augusta State University is accredited by an organization with the exciting name of, "The Council for Accreditation of Counseling and Related Educational Programs (CACREP)" As part of the accreditation deal, the University agreed to teach its counseling students to professionally conduct themselves according to the American Counseling Association’s (ACA) Code of Ethics. The Code includes ethical principles such as (.pdf pp. 6-7):
and:“Counselors are aware of their own values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and avoid imposing values that are inconsistent with counseling goals. Counselors respect the diversity of clients, trainees, and research participants”
“Counselors do not condone or engage in discrimination based on age, culture, disability, ethnicity, race, religion/spirituality, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, marital status/partnership, language preference, socioeconomic status, or any basis proscribed by law.”
There are quite a few details to the case, but in effect, the University asked Jennifer Keeton to professionally conduct herself according to the ACA Code of Ethics and she refused to so.
Some years ago, I paid for my college room and board by working as a fire fighter. I do not now recall that we ever -- even once -- asked someone about their sexual orientation before knocking down their fire or extracting them from their wrecked car. More to the point: Had I decided back then that I would only provide my services to heterosexuals, I would have been (justifiably) fired. But the judges of the 11th Circuit said it best (.pdf pp. 30):
Of course, what Keeton was attempting to do with her lawsuit should be transparent to anyone: She was trying to force the University to make her an exception to the rule that counseling students must be taught to professionally conduct themselves according to the ACA Code of Ethics. In short, she was looking for preferential treatment.Every profession has its own ethical codes and dictates. When someone voluntarily chooses to enter a profession, he or she must comply with its rules and ethical requirements. Lawyers must present legal arguments on behalf of their clients, notwithstanding their personal views. Judges must apply the law, even when they disagree with it. So too counselors must refrain from imposing their moral and religious values on their clients.
In order to secure preferential treatment, she cynically tried to play the Christ Card. That is, she deceitfully tried to fob herself off as -- not some jerk seeking preferential treatment -- but someone wrongfully oppressed because she is a Christian.
Of course, some folks are now tripping over themselves in their rush to buy into Jennifer Keeton's notion of herself as a martyr. Here is what they have been saying...
Ramona Hicks Willis thinks, "This is not a questions of ethics, it is a power play by the homosexuals. They want to destroy anyone that does not agree with their lifestyle. Plain and simple."
The Court's ruling in the case seems to have traumatized Diana Shugar, who is suddenly ready to give up on life: "God is not the god of this world; Satan is. Satan is the invisible god of this world. He is the author of its organization, its basic philosophies, its systems of government, business, society—yes, AND RELIGIONS! It's best to just tell people of the new upcoming world ruled by our Lord and Savior. This one is beyond redemption."
Michael Galvin fully agrees with Diana that requiring Jennifer Keeton to live up to a professional code of ethics is so traumatizing the end of the world must be near: "You are right. We cannot save this world and the people in it. God desires that none would perish, but they have rejected Him and His Gospel. The date it set, the orchestra is in tune, the curtain is soon to be lifted."
Adrienne Elizabeth Crawford cannot believe Keeton did anything wrong. Apparently, she just doesn't get what the case was all about. Nevertheless, she's sure it has something to do with the way Christians are always being persecuted: "It’s just really sad that this woman is being reprimanded (so to speak) for her beliefs. We ALL have a right to our own beliefs. I don’t believe she did anything wrong. But we as Christians should not be surprised by this persecution. After all, we live in Satan’s world. He’s the Prince of this world but only temporarily."
Tolfe Lee Albert thinks working with gay kids is a lot like risking your life -- or at least your health (he's not sure which): "What if the student had AIDS, or a very bad cold...would she not have the right to refuse that student? Where are HER rights. Another victory for the ACLU and loss of our personal rights and dignity."
Last, Jack Oliver thinks he knows the sacred duty of a true Christian: "As a christan [sic] she is bound to speak up against queres [sic]."
Jennifer Keeton played the Christ Card by demanding special privileges for herself while shouting that she was being discriminated against. Naturally -- inevitably -- some folks bought her story. But it would be a mistake to assume -- simply because some Christians have uncritically bought Keeton's story -- that the majority of Christians in America agree with them, for there is no evidence that the majority do in fact agree with the poor fools among us.
(H/T: Chappie at An Apostate's Chapel)
How to Interpret the Bible: Sunstone's Authoritative Guide to Biblical Interpretation
As loyal, beloved readers of this blog might know, I am no authority on the Bible. That is, I know the Bible is the book everyone quotes and no one reads -- but that's about the extent of my knowledge.
So today's blog post might be a wee bit out of my league -- in much the same sense that my attempting to dog paddle across the Pacific Ocean might be a wee bit out of my league -- because I intend to discuss how the Bible should be interpreted.
Never mind that I don't know how the Bible should be interpreted. Never mind that I haven't even read the thing. And never mind that I only got it into my head a couple hours ago that I should have an opinion about how it should be interpreted. No, never mind any of that.
None of those things matter because I'm an American. And -- as even I know -- Americans, with a little help from the British, all but invented the custom of interpreting the Bible literally. At least, that's what my professors used to tell me. The notion the Bible should be interpreted literally was invented -- mostly by Americans -- during the 1800s. Before that, you have nearly 2000 years of Biblical scholarship in which almost no one with a brain seriously thought the Bible was to be taken literally.
But today, 3 in 10 Americans interpret the Bible literally, saying it is the actual word of God.
The above is proof Americans have da balls. No other people -- except for a few Brits (who probably don't count anyway, since they lost the Revolutionary War) -- have had the courage to tell their God that he simply cannot speak metaphorically or symbolically. Go us!
In other words, as an American, I come from a proud tradition of claiming I know all about how to interpret the Bible. And on the firm basis of that tradition, I feel confident that I have the sacred right to tell you and the world how the Bible is to be interpreted. How cool is that?
So, let's put the meat on the table: Should we or should we not interpret the Bible literally?
Well, you'll be relieved to know I have discovered -- after sheer minutes of research -- the one true answer to that question. As it happens, the one true answer is contained in Proverbs 12:19. Anyone who thinks through that passage will surely come to the same conclusion I have: Contra the American tradition, the Bible was not meant to always be taken literally.
The exciting passage reads: "Truthful lips endure forever, but a lying tongue lasts only a moment."
Ha! I say, "Ha!", because anyone with a lick of sense knows that passage is false if taken literally. It is only true -- if it is true at all -- if taken symbolically.
QED: I'm right. One hundred million Americans are wrong. The Bible is not always meant to be taken literally. The matter is settled.
Anyone who now wishes to show his or her appreciation for having an authoritative answer to the question, "Should we or should we not interpret the Bible literally?", may send a modest donation of $29.95 to Uncle Sunstone's Refuge for Wayward Dancing Girls. You can be confident your donation will help buy the g-strings those girls desperately need to stay warm at my place during the winter.
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